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This paper examines the reactions to a complex case involving a series of developments la-
beled in the United States as Russia’s meddling in the 2016 American elections. The paper ad-
dresses major developments or political fallouts of Russiagate. First, some politicians, mostly 
in Russia but only few in the West, insisted that there has been no meddling or interference. 
Second, to other commentators, especially in the West, the meddling with US elections indeed 
took place. Yet to others, and this is the third development, the problem was not necessarily 
about the act of the 2016 meddling, but rather about the following “collusion” between Donald 
Trump and some Moscow’s operatives, on the other, and their attempts to “cover up” their 
mutual illegal affairs. In the context of these policy narratives, this paper’s conclusion refers 
to the “We had it coming” phenomenon in international relations. The Russiagate became a 
subject conveniently fitted in the political narratives of both national capitals. In Moscow the 
belief has been that this case had been totally fabricated and fueled by anti-Russian sentiments 
in Washington. In the United States, there is little doubt that Russia has meddled with the 
elections and would do it again. Both sides used the case to advance their strategic domestic 
foreign policy narratives.
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This paper examines the reactions to a complex case involving a series of develop-
ments labeled in the United States as Russia’s meddling in the 2016 American elections. 
In has also been often nicknamed as Russian interference or Russiagate. In the English 
language Russiagate is used to allude to the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, which resulted 
in president Nixon’s resignation from the office. The paper addresses three major develop-
ments or political fallouts of Russiagate. First, some politicians and commentators, mostly 
in Russia yet few in the West, insisted that there has been no meddling or interference. To 
them, the causes of this political scandal have been political forces in the West interested 
to blow this case out of proportion to smear Russia and achieve their domestic political 
goals. Second, to other commentators, especially in the West, the meddling with US elec-
tions indeed took place. They refer to official government documents to support their 
view. It was unknown for years however how much the Moscow’s leaders knew about 
the interference and who had actually ordered it. This point of view received substantial 
support in official documents in the United States and in the media in the West. Yet to 
others, and this is the third development, the problem was not necessarily about the act 
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of the 2016 meddling but rather about the following “collusion” between Donald Trump 
and some Moscow’s operatives, on the other, and their attempts to “cover up” their mutual 
illegal affairs. Meanwhile, the relations between Russia and the United States have been 
worsening.
The debates related to Russiagate in Russia and the United States have been for years 
clearly ideological and distinctly partisan. Although the allegations of the Trump-Russia 
collusion have been largely dismissed by 2019, Trump’s domestic critics focused instead 
mostly on the president’s and his associates’ assumed interference with the legal investiga-
tion of the alleged collusion. Such interference would be deemed illegal based on Ameri-
can laws. Most supporters of the Democrat Party tended to hold on to the idea of the 
interference. Most supporters of the Republican Party did not. The Russiagate has become 
a common theme of discussions in the United States associated with Trump’s presidency. 
The scandal has also played a major role in worsening of US—Russia relations.
Washington’s Views of the Collusion 
Although the proof of the alleged collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign 
(involving operating contacts and communications between the sides or coordination of 
their activities) has been debated for two years and eventually dismissed in the 2019 Mu-
eller Report, officially titled Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 
2016 Presidential Election (Robert Mueller was a specially appointed federal counsel), the 
“collision” and related to it conspiracy theories have been circulated in the media and were 
preset the political discourse in Washington for years. From anchors on major television 
networks to late nigh comedians, from media commentators to office casual conversa-
tions, the allusions and innuendo about Trump’s ties to Russia have been relentless.
The “Russian investigation” and the potential obstruction of justice associated with 
the investigation of the Trump’s electoral campaign’s interactions with Russian officials 
was a central theme of a larger political scandal in Washington in 2017–2020. The scandal 
has certainly affected a series of new allegations against Trump in 2019. These allega-
tions focused on president’s use of diplomacy to affect electoral laws and politics in his 
own country. In a phone call to Ukrainian president in the summer of that year, Trump 
discussed possible investigative or legal actions against a family member of his electoral 
opponent, Joe Biden, a Democrat. The theme of “collusion” with a foreign government to 
achieve domestic political goals has again been revived as a theme connecting Russiagate 
with new developments. This collusion theme was also impactful on domestic politics 
during the 2020 presidential campaign. Overall, the real extent and bearing of the Krem-
lin’s involvement in hacking Democratic servers and the WikiLeaks disclosures will prob-
ably never be fully known and is likely to be interpreted with various political and legal 
standards [1].
Washington’s Views of the Interference
While the collusion allegations have been largely dropped from pubic discussions by 
2019, the interference subject has not. In the eyes of the public, Russia has played an unex-
pectedly high-profile role in the 2016 US presidential elections and continued to play that 
role for many years after. Quite a few American experts and politicians have alleged that 
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Moscow had deliberately intervened in the electoral process in the United States. The out-
going Obama administration in 2016, for example, stated clearly that the Russian govern-
ment attempted to interfere in the elections. Official government statements in 2017 and 
later also suggested that the US intelligence had obtained information about Russia’s at-
tempts to gain access to the software used in voting machines. The 2019 Mueller Report 
came to a similar conclusion. The report found that the Russian government “interfered in 
the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion” and also “violated US 
criminal law” [2]. The US government also revealed that Russia orchestrated the hacking 
of emails of several political organizations, including the Democratic Party. (The hackers 
allegedly did not try to access the Republican Party’s communications.) Those hacking at-
tacks resulted in the public release of thousands of stolen emails, many of which included 
damaging revelations about the Democratic Party and former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, the party’s nominee in 2016 [3]. More reports came in 2018 and later to support 
these and other claims of Moscow’s interference. 
Specifically, according to the published comments of several government officials, 
hackers broke into the e-mail accounts of the Democratic National Committee and 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair, John Podesta. The content of the emails was then passed 
to WikiLeaks, an international non-profit organization that had gained prominence in the 
past for publishing of secret government information, usually stolen or obtained by other 
means. The content of the Podesta emails was made public during the summer and fall 
of 2016. US officials stated on many occasions that the hackers were Russian. However, 
disagreements abound about who ordered, directed, and coordinated these hacking at-
tacks. Political messages were motivated by these disagreements. Clinton’s supporters as 
well as several government sources in the Obama administration claimed that discrediting 
Clinton during the electoral campaign was the key focus of the alleged Russian operation 
[4]. In several interviews after 2017 and in her autobiography, Clinton herself described 
the hacking as a key reason for her loss [5]. Trump supporters, on the other hand, as well 
as most Republicans, either rejected the allegations about the scope and breadth of Rus-
sia’s direct involvement (although they acknowledged that the interference took place) or 
insisted that the hacking had nothing to do with Clinton’s losing the presidential bid. 
But why the interference theme has gained momentum in the United States? And 
what kind of motivations have been attributed to the forces (real or alleged) behind the 
2016 meddling use to mess up with the elections in the United States? 
Motivations Behind the Interference
Although president Putin never publicly took any political party’s side in the US elec-
tion and did not openly support any candidate, most experts in the West believed that he 
favored Trump over Clinton. A few government sources including US intelligence agen-
cies suggested that Putin was supportive of Trump and wanted him to win presidency [6]. 
Several arguments supported this view. First, Trump made numerous references and allu-
sions to a possible improvement of relations with Moscow (if that improvement benefited 
the United States) during his campaign speeches. In 2018, Putin made a remark during a 
press conference in Helsinki that he had hopes for Trump in 2016 because as a presiden-
tial candidate Trump talked about bringing the US—Russia relationship back to normal 
[7]. Second, on several occasions Trump criticized NATO and its role in international 
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affairs. Moscow officials consistently opposed this Western alliance and welcomed such 
Trump’s statements. Any internal disagreements and tensions among NATO members 
would satisfy Moscow’s strategic objectives. Third, Trump was not particularly critical of 
Russia’s takeover of Crimea, an act that was one of the key reasons for Western sanctions 
against Russia. Trump did not vigorously — as it seems from his statements and electoral 
speeches — support sanctions against Russia. Trump also made several seemingly positive 
comments about Putin as an individual and as a politician, calling him a “strong leader”.
It has also been reported in the United States that neither the Kremlin nor the media 
in Russia were particularly happy with Hillary Clinton or the outgoing Obama administra-
tion’s policies toward Russia. The proposed “reset” in the relations between the two countries 
was an obvious failure, which Moscow blamed on president Obama and his government in 
Washington [8]. It was reported in the media that in Russia different national polls, at differ-
ent times, with different questions asked, showed Russian people’s preference of Trump over 
Clinton. Although many, more than 50 % would not express any definite opinion (“hard 
to tell”) answering a question on whose victory of the two candidates would be better for 
Russia, Trump was supported by large margins. After his victory in November, almost two 
thirds of respondents believed his win had been beneficial to Russia [9]. 
Washington’s commentators maintained a different view. Some of them thought that 
Russian leaders might have been enjoying creating trouble and “messing” with the US 
elections. Putin, according to this view, most likely had a personal dislike of the Demo-
crats and their foreign policy. Trump, on the other hand, was generally seen in Moscow 
as a “chaos candidate” who tried to shake up the bureaucracy in Washington was well 
as to change western policies toward Russia. From this view, under Clinton, if she were 
elected president, the relations between Moscow and Washington would have remained 
bad. They would have been rooted in mistrust and limited by cooperation only on cer-
tain issues. The sanctions against Russia would have stayed in place and even worsened. 
Trump  — with all his habitual unpredictable moves and mercurial personality  — still 
appeared to be a candidate better suited to Russia’s goals in the international sphere [1].
Linking Trump to Russia in 2016 and Later
It was commonly suggested in the United States (without providing proof by Trump 
opponents) that candidate Trump was somehow linked to Russia or some Russian “inter-
ests”. The Trump–Russia Dossier was a key source of the accusations against Trump. Also 
known as the Steele dossier, it was a private 2016 intelligence report containing allegations 
of behavioral misconduct and conspiracy between Donald Trump’s presidential campaign 
and the government of Russia. The document was authored by Christopher Steele, a for-
mer British intelligence (MI6) operative, for the private investigative firm Fusion GPS. 
While compiling the dossier, Steele passed unverified information to both British and 
American intelligence. Numerous sources suggested that this document has been mostly 
fabricated and paid for by individuals associated with Clinton’s presidential campaign. 
Steele believed, however, that he was not aware the Clinton campaign was the recipient 
of his research [10]. The Trump–Russia dossier has for years become a source of direct 
and indirect allegations linking Trump to Russia and questioning his motivations in his 
foreign policy.
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There were other arguments suggesting that Russia was really interested in electing 
Trump in 2016. Russian communists, were seen in the West as somewhat resembling their 
predecessors in the Soviet Union when communism was the only legally allowed political 
party, have historically been very critical of the United Sates and its policies. They have 
also been historically against economic cooperation with the West, the free market, and 
especially Western liberal values. Trump appeared as an unusual candidate. As was ex-
pected, Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party, made numerous negative 
comments about Washington’s foreign policy and the 2016 elections as well. In one inter-
view, right after Trump was elected, he called US elections the “dirtiest,” referring, among 
other things, to the harsh rhetoric employed by the candidates (Obviously, Zyuganov has 
no empirical proof to call the elections this way). He also called Trump diminutively a 
“nontraditional politician” who had no experience in politics. His election nevertheless 
had a special significance, in Zyuganov’s view, because it was a sound defeat of support-
ers of globalization who were obsessed with military interventions and profits. Trump, as 
Zyuganov said, had made several “hopeful” statements but his real politics would have 
to wait to be properly assessed. President Obama, Zyuganov continued, also seemed like 
a decent man, but had pulled the United States into numerous military confrontations. 
He proposed that the most desirable outcome of Trump’s policies would be that the US 
would not engage in Syria and Ukraine and would not “mess” with Europe. Zyuganov did 
not miss an opportunity to attack NATO and the CIA for their “audacity” associated with 
occupying and “burn[ing] down” entire countries. If these policies were stopped, presum-
ably by Trump, the world would benefit [11].
Vladimir Zhirinovsky openly supported Trump. In an emotional and theatrical ti-
rade posted on Facebook and televised, Zhirinovsky openly asked American voters to cast 
their votes for Trump and not elect Clinton. In the middle of his passionate declaration 
he shouted in English, “Long live Trump!” Zhirinovsky also verbally attacked Clinton. He 
claimed that the Senator represented an old and corrupt elite and that her Republican op-
ponent, in contrast, was a fresh, independent figure. Trump represented, he argued, hope 
for “humanity” and for people all over the world, including Russia [12].
Alexey Navalny, who remained a very visible figure in the West and was very popu-
lar for years among professional experts studying Russia in the United States, described 
Trump — after he was elected — as a “self-made” winner, a person who won without get-
ting much support from the establishment. He would be a person, according to Navalny 
who is known in Russia for his struggle for transparency and against government cor-
ruption, who would fight against corruption in the government. Another public figure, 
Vyacheslav Maltsev, known for his gloomy, pessimistic social forecasts, disagreed with 
many people’s positive assessments of Washington’s future foreign policy under Trump. 
He predicted in 2016 that Trump would likely consider a very confrontational approach 
with Russia. Maltsev believed that Trump would specifically be very tough on Russians 
elites [13]. This type of cautious and even pessimistic view of Russian-American relations 
was rather rare in the Russian media after the 2016 elections. In Russia Trump was gener-
ally perceived as a man who wanted to reform and restructure the whole political system 
in The United States including its foreign policy, which was expected was a good news 
for Russia. For many commentators and members of the public this would have been an 
extremely positive development [13].
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The Aftermath
In reality, by January 2017, the level of optimism among Russians about improve-
ments in US—Russia relations has declined from 54 % to 46 %. This decline may have 
been caused by a number of events and comments coming from the Tramp administration 
and the Kremlin. Disagreements between Kremlin and the White House continued prac-
tically in all areas. Sanctions against Russia remained in place and the new Washington 
establishment indicated it had no plans to go “easy” on Moscow. Both countries agreed 
on the necessity to fight Islamic fundamentalism yet they were far apart regarding the 
actions in Syria and this country’s future. Both countries kept accusing each other of com-
mitting atrocities there. Meanwhile, NATO expanded to include Montenegro. In April of 
2017, 55 percent of Russians said they had not seen any change in US–Russia relations 
since Trump’s becoming president. American media reported that about 20 percent said 
relations had improved, but 17 percent said the relationship had become worse. Positive 
opinions of Trump among Russians have plummeted from 38 to 13 % [14]. 
During Trump administration’s years, political leaders in Washington became increas-
ingly frustrated by new evidence obtaining by intelligence sources pointing to Russia’s at-
tempts to meddle in the 2016 US elections. This frustration was bipartisan. It was not neces-
sarily about Clinton’s loss, but rather about an attempt by a foreign power undermine Amer-
ican electoral system and democracy [5]. In a highly publicized interview with the former 
NBC TV anchor Megyn Kelly Putin firmly denied all the allegations [15]. Washington and 
the vast majority of American commentators were not impressed with his denials. When 
Trump suggested that he trusted Putin that Russia had no role with the meddling with US 
elections, criticisms of the Trump’ attitude followed [7]. The criticism was bipartisan. The 
focus of most criticisms was Trump’s perceived acceptance of Putin’s denial of Russia’s in-
volvement in the 2016 United States elections, which contradicted the findings of various US 
intelligence sources. Moreover, twelve Russian GRU agents had been indicted a few days as 
part of the ongoing Special Counsel investigation. On the contrary, it was reported that the 
reaction of the Russian media on Trump’s comment was very positive [16]. 
Meanwhile, governments in Moscow and Washington after 2016 remained reluctant 
about making definitive statements about the direction of their relations [17]. It seems that 
both sides have confirmed their earlier mutual expectations: first, they did not trust each 
other; second, neither side wanted to appear weak vis-à-vis each other. Multiple hints in the 
media about possibilities of improving relations with Russia have, in fact, backfired against 
Trump in the domestic arena during his tenure. Russia became an inconvenient subject in 
the United States to talk about. It was a paradox: Any signs of worsening relations with Rus-
sia could have been assessed as his incompetence or a strategic foreign policy failure. On the 
other hand, any signs of improving relations could have also backfired against Trump. What 
went wrong in Russian-American relations? The answer is: almost everything in the twenty-
first century did. Both sides saw the worsening a long time coming. 
On US—Russia Relations: A Historical Snapshot
It is emphasized in western thought that from the beginning of the 18th century and 
later, Russian thinkers have debated which developmental path the Russian state should 
take. Should it be based on a foreign model (such as Dutch, French, or other) or should it 
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be a completely independent path of development? Studies in comparative politics suggest 
that such debates are not unusual in other countries. Chinese and Japanese scholars, for 
example, in the 20th century have debated the same question: which foreign model should 
their countries have to choose? In the United Sates, on the other hand, this type of debates 
is uncommon. American scholars, for the post part, have been settled on the idea that 
the United States has had its own, unique path of development. Any ideas of following a 
“foreign” model have been criticized and usually rejected by scholars and experts across 
the ideological spectrum. 
In the United States as well as in the West in general, Russia’s views of its place in the 
world is described as influenced by two traditions or schools of thought. According to the 
first view, Russia, imagined as a predominantly traditionalist, authoritarian yet provincial 
country, isolated from the outside world, feared and mistrusted by its neighbors [18]. The 
other path led toward partnership with the West, openness to innovations and an emula-
tion of the West’s social and political systems as well as its lifestyle. In this case, Russia 
would possibly lose its cultural specificity. To some in Russia, this could have been a posi-
tive, desirable development. To others, this could have been totally unacceptable. Facing 
this dilemma, most Russian leaders and academics, no matter if they were affiliated with 
those in power or opposed to them, confronted the predicament of overcoming the coun-
try’s economic and social backwardness without losing its political independence and rich 
cultural heritage. This is the foundation for the chronically ambivalent attitude toward 
the West and the United States. It is commonly accepted in the West that anti-western at-
titudes became prevalent in the 1990s as Russian-US relations were seen through the lens 
of increasingly diverse ideologies such as populism, nationalism, and conservatism. This 
trend is not necessarily unique to Russia. Quite a few politicians, populist parties, and na-
tionalist movements, as we could see such developments after 2016 in different countries, 
have promoted modern populism and nationalism in the era of globalization.
In the second half of 1990s, several serious signs of tension between the two countries 
emerged. The United States’ military engagement in the former Yugoslavia, the growth of 
NATO, and Russia’s economic difficulties contributed to many people’s growing disap-
pointment with the West, which in the eyes of many could have done more to help Russia. 
Communists, nationalists, and populists in Russia turned to the rhetoric of the Cold War 
blaming the West for most of Russia’s economic and social problems. In their view, help 
had been offered but not delivered. The financial crisis of 1998 reinforced the opinion of 
many that Russia was left on its own to struggle with economic difficulties. Many support-
ers of pro-Western policies lost their government posts as well as popularity. The 2003 war 
in Iraq, unlike the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, was harshly criticized in Russia. Moscow 
also expressed concern about what they believed was the United States’ intrusion into the 
internal affairs of former Soviet republics. Russian officials and the media portrayed the 
unrests in Georgia (in 2003), Ukraine (in 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (in 2005) as sponsored by 
western governments and nongovernmental organizations acting on their behalf.
In February 2007, Russian president Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at an interna-
tional Munich conference on security policy, which western experts considered the sym-
bolic beginning of a long-term confrontation between Moscow and the West [19]. He 
sharply criticized the unipolar model of the world and Washington’s role in that system. 
Putin called the continuing expansion of NATO “a serious provocation” that diminished 
the existence of mutual trust between Russia and the West. He accused the West of build-
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ing new economic and political barriers, and called for a new “reasonable balance” be-
tween the interests of all countries, obliquely critiquing US dominance in global affairs. 
Putin emphasized that Russia would carry out an “independent foreign policy” to ensure 
security and prosperity “not only for a select few, but for all.” He also blasted international 
organizations for promoting interests of only “a few dominant” countries, another criti-
cism clearly directed at the West and the United States [19]. For years to come, this speech 
will likely to be considered as a giant strategic mistake of Russian foreign policy.
The United States seemed to ignore many warning signs of tension coming from 
Russia. The Bush administration (2001–2008) largely discounted the problems while be-
ing preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the emerging financial crisis. 
After Barack Obama became president in 2009  — in the midst of the world financial 
crisis—he spoke in favor of improving relations with Russia despite Washington’s earlier 
condemnation of the Russian actions in Georgia. Yet the period after 2012, when Putin 
returned to power as president, was a serious deterioration in the Russian-American af-
fairs. Moscow and Washington still cooperated in some areas. Yet they competed in many 
others. Disagreements between the two nations about almost every international issue 
intensified. The Russian government and media have stepped up their anti-American in-
formation campaign, which at times has reached Cold-War levels. In an article in The 
New York Times (most likely written by his domestic surrogates) Putin openly criticized 
American exceptionalism and Washington’s policies [20]. Washington’s cancellation of a 
presidential visit to Moscow in September 2013 was a strong indication of the crisis in the 
Russian-American relations.
The most noteworthy tensions between Russia and the United States emerged over 
the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and after and the incorporation of Crimea into the Rus-
sian Federation. The United States and essentially all Western countries condemned or 
criticized what they saw as Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia vehemently rejected the 
“annexation” label. In March 2014, the United States announced sanctions against several 
Russian senior officials and took steps to weaken Russia’s formal position in several inter-
national organizations. These sanctions have been expanded and extended several times, 
combined with other economic and financial sanctions imposed by the US Congress, such 
as in 2018 and 2019. Moscow replied with defiance and introduced its own counter-sanc-
tions against the United States and other western countries. The “political knot” has been 
tightening [9].
The West was historically been hesitant to embrace Russia as a peer. Russia’s politics 
and economy were often perceived as rooted in corruption, nepotism, and authoritarian 
values. Opinion polls conducted in the United States showed that most Americans tended 
to see Russia positively when the key political events indicated that these two countries 
were on the path of cooperation. Political clashes would send the views into a negative 
territory [21]. Because of these and other factors (including strategic political miscalcu-
lations, as they are seen in the West) the Russian elites had assumed that they no longer 
had to rely on the West, which was increasingly viewed by them as decadent, excessively 
liberal, and decaying [15]. Putin has made a decision to embrace conservative and nation-
alist values, to “pivot” toward the East, engage China strategically, and de-emphasize the 
importance of western political and economic system.
Several specific issues remained very important for the US—Russia relations. A spe-
cial significance had the 2012 Magnitsky Act, which was a bipartisan bill passed by the 
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US Congress and signed by President Obama to penalize Russian officials believed to be 
responsible for the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow prison back in 
2009. The Snowden case has also stood out. Edward Snowden was an American computer 
professional, employed by CIA, who in 2013 illegally copied and leaked classified infor-
mation from the National Security Agency. By doing this, he revealed massive surveillance 
programs managed by the US government. These programs were in place as part counter-
terrorism policies. Snowed, who fled the United States, was charged with espionage and 
theft of government property. He received a temporary asylum status in Russia (it may 
change by the time you read these pages). Although Snowden’s actions have sparked a ma-
jor international debate about national security and individual privacy, the United States’ 
was very critical of Russia’s cozy relations with Snowden and Moscow’s approval of his 
status as an asylum seeker there.
In 2016 Russia adopted the Law FZ-318 (31 October), which underlined a few condi-
tions for a potentially new stage of cooperation with the United States. Moscow wanted 
the suspension of the Magnitsky act. Russia also hoped for the suspension of the Ukraine 
Freedom Support Act of 2014, which was designed, from Washington’s view, to assist 
the government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity after the 
events in 2014, which were overwhelmingly considered in the West as an act of aggression 
against a sovereign state. Washington also aimed at deterring the government of the Rus-
sian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent 
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Moscow for years wanted the reduction of 
the United States’ military presence in Europe as well as a financial compensation from 
the West for the losses associated with the anti-Russian sanctions. Moscow also signaled 
that many arms control issues have no longer been its priority, at least for some time. 
In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF Treaty) accusing Russia of violating the agreement in previous decades. Russia re-
jected such claims. The treaty has no longer legally bound both countries entering the 
third decade of the twenty-first century. 
All in all, the relations between Moscow and Washington by the late 2010s have 
reached their lowest point since the early 1980s. Embassies had to reduce their staff. Sev-
eral consulates were closed. Most, if not all, government exchange programs between the 
two countries were cancelled. Universities, both state and private, have suspended their 
bilateral educational programs too. Russian citizens had to wait for many months to ob-
tain their visas to visit the United States. Russian mainstream media had a field day attack-
ing America and its policies. Scorning America and Washington policies became a norm 
in Russian media broadcasts. US media responded in kind. Not surprisingly, American 
news professionals provided mostly very critical information and analysis about Russia 
and its policies. Such developments were far from surprising. 
The Differences in US and Russian Foreign Policy Narratives 
The 2016 case of Russia’s meddling with the elections in the United States should be 
considered in the context of the problems that have emerged and multiplied between the 
two countries in the second decade of the century. These problems were also rooted in 
substantial differences between Moscow and Washington foreign policy narratives [9]. 
Policy narratives in the context of foreign policy are concise, brief accounts of a country’s 
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top priorities in achieving its foreign policy goals. These narratives reveal themselves in 
policy strategies, immediate and long-term plans, peaceful treaties, negotiation tactics, or 
anything else. Policy narratives in most cases are not just passing judgments or decisions. 
They are relatively stable long-term agendas suggested by the government and followed by 
foreign policy elites. Such plans rely on particular policies, including military, economic, 
diplomatic, etc., to reach defined or general policy goals. Countries conduct foreign poli-
cies — including building bilateral relations with other states—based on such countries’ 
narratives. International events and other countries’ actions are judged through the lenses 
of foreign policy narratives. 
In the contexts of such narratives, already by the early twenty-first century, Moscow 
and Washington have formulated quite different and sustainable visions of the world and 
their countries’ foreign policy strategies. The 2016 Russiagate therefore was a convenient 
case to fit into these narratives. 
Although Moscow and Washington both acknowledged that the world has become 
increasingly globalized, they have different views of the scope and the importance of new 
emerging centers of power. Although the world was becoming multipolar (polycentric, as 
it is commonly used in Russia but not in the United States), it has not reached the stage of 
the presence of “real” multiple powers. Washington’s experts maintained for years that the 
United Sates still was the strongest military and financial power unmatched by any other 
country’s attempts to become the next superpower, no mater how hard they have tried to 
convey their desire to become another “superpower”. America’s and western dominance 
in the world should play a stabilizing role in global affairs, according to the Washington’s 
view. When Russia demanded an increased role of international institutions such as the 
United Nations, Washington was doubtful of the UN’s role. Russia believed in its place in 
G-8 as an equal partner. Western powers too were skeptical of this idea for years while of-
fering special conditions to Moscow’s return to the group. 
Both sides disagreed with each other’s foreign policies and accused each other of us-
ing violence and intimidation in international affairs and supporting rouge regimes. Rus-
sia in most cases referred to Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington focused mostly on Russian 
actions in Syria. From the Washington’s view, Russia increasingly used violence in places 
such as Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. In Washington’s view, multilateral solutions can work, 
but not when they serve the interests of one side, such as Russia. 
Russia strongly demanded that NATO must halt its eastward expansion; in particu-
lar, Ukraine and Georgia must never become NATO members. Western countries, on the 
other hand, insisted that the decision to join NATO is strictly at the disposal of sovereign 
countries. NATO has the right to expand as far as it desires, as well as any country has the 
right to join NATO if it is qualified. No other foreign power has the right to interfere in 
this process. 
One of the most difficult topics has been the sanctions against Russia. In Moscow’s 
view, all the financial and economic sanctions against Russia should be lifted and, possibly, 
a fair compensation granted. The West should accept a new status of Crimea as a part of 
Russia and diplomatically assist Russia and other conflicting sides in resolving the crisis in 
the eastern Ukraine. Washington’s narrative has been different. In reference to Russia and 
Ukraine, international sanctions could be lifted only in case of Russia’s complete military 
withdrawal from Ukraine and Moscow’s recognition of Ukrainian authority over several 
territories in Easter Ukraine. Moreover, Crimea would be recognized as a part of Russia. 
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In the context of these policy narratives, this paper’s conclusion refers to the “We 
had it coming” phenomenon in international relations. In colloquial English, this expres-
sion means that something unpleasant can — and even will — happen, especially if one 
deserves it. Along with wide-ranging disagreements about Moscow’s role in the 2016 US 
elections, the relations between Moscow and Washington have been further deteriorating 
in the second decade of the century and possibly reaching their lowest points since the end 
of the Soviet Union. Both sides perused different political agendas in international affairs. 
Moscow and Washington had competing interests related to natural resources, especially 
oil and gas. Russia has assigned itself a bigger role in a polycentric world, which Wash-
ington was skeptical about. Both countries accused each other of each other’s responsibil-
ity for the worsening of their mutual affairs. In these contexts, the Russiagate became a 
subject conveniently fitted in the political narratives of both national capitals. In Moscow 
the belief has been that this case had been totally fabricated and fueled by anti-Russian 
sentiments in Washington. In the United States, there is little doubt that Russia has med-
dled with the elections and would do it again. Both sides used the case to advance their 
strategic domestic foreign policy narratives. Will these narratives change? As optimists 
say, when the ocean tides rise, they always fall back. 
References
1. Walker, S. (2016), How the World Views the US elections, from Israel to North Korea. The Guardian, 
October 31, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/31/world-opinion-us-election-
russia-china-mexico-europe (accessed: 20.07.2019).
2. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016  Presidential Election, available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf (accessed: 20.07.2019).
3. Diamond, J. (2016), Russian hacking and the 2016 election: What you need to know. CNN Politics, De-
cember 12, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/12/politics/russian-hack-donald-trump-2016-elec-
tion/ (accessed: 20.07.2019).
4. Yaffa, J. (2016), Russia’s View of the Election Hacks: Denials, Amusement, Comeuppance. The New 
Yorker, December 20, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/russias-view-of-the-elec-
tion-hacks-denials-amusement-comeuppance (accessed: 20.07.2019).
5. Former FBI Director James Comey’s Senate testimony (2017). CNN.com, June 8, available at: http://
www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2017/06/08/james-comey-hearing-opening-sot.cnn/video/playlists/james-
comey-hearing/ (accessed: 20.07.2019).
6. Blake, A. (2017), The 11  Most Important Lines from the New Intelligence Report on Russia’s 
Hacking. The Washington Post, January 6, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2017/01/06/the-most-important-lines-from-the-new-intelligence-report-on-russias-hacking/?utm_
term=.4234fbac2faa (accessed: 20.07.2019).
7. Friedman, U. (2018), The White House Transcript Is Missing the Most Explosive Part of the Trump–
Putin Press Conference. The Atlantic, July 17, available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2018/07/trump-putin-press-conference-transcript/565385/ (accessed: 20.07.2019).
8. Carroll, L. (2016), Russia and Its Influence on the Presidential Election. Politifact, December 1, avail-
able at: http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/dec/01/russia-and-its-influence-presidential-
election/ (accessed: 20.07.2019).
9. Shiraev, E., Khudoley, K. (2018), Russian Foreign Policy. Macmillan, London. 
10. Mayer, J. (2018), Christopher Steele, the Man Behind the Trump Dossier. The New Yorker, avail-
able at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/12/christopher-steele-the-man-behind-the-trump-
dossier (accessed: 20.07.2019).
11. Comments Made by Zyuganov about Trump’s victory in the US Elections (2016). Russian.RT, No-
vember 10, available at: https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/332003-zyuganov-tramp-prezident (accessed: 
20.07.2019).
12. Zhirinovsky, V. (2016), November 1  Statement in Support of Candidate Donald Trump Online. 
Lenta.ru, November 6, available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/06/votefortrump (accessed: 20.07.2019).
476 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 4
13. Goncharov, S. (2016), A Universal Trump. Intersection, November 21, available at: http://intersec-
tionproject.eu/ru/article/politics/universalnyy-tramp (accessed: 20.07.2019).
14. Poll: Trump’s Popularity Plummets in Russia (2017). US News, April 17, available at: https://www.
usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-04-17/trump-popularity-plummets-in-russia-poll-shows (accessed: 
20.07.2019).
15. Vladimir Putin. An interview with Meghan Kelly (2017). To Inform is to Influence. June 5, available at: 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/megyn-kelly-putin-interview_us_59456c6ce4b01eab7a2e1e31  (ac-
cessed: 20.07.2019).
16. Smith, A. (2018), International reaction to Trump-Putin meeting is mixed. NBC News, July 17, avail-
able at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/international- %20reaction-trump-putin-meeting-mixed-
n891936 (accessed: 20.07.2019).
17. Opinion poll conducted January 20–23 (2017). Levada.ru, January 26, available at: http://www.lev-
ada.ru/2017/01/26/izbranie-trampa (accessed: 20.07.2019).
18. Rabow-Edlong, S. (2012), Slavophile Thought and the Politics of Cultural Nationalism. SUNY Press, 
Albany, New York.
19. Putin, V. (2007), Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
February 10, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (accessed: 20.07.2019).
20. Putin, V. (2013), A Plea for Caution From Russia. The New York Times, September 12, available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?hp&_
r=1& (accessed: 20.07.2019).
21. Gallup Polls on Russia (2019). Gallup, Inc, available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/1642/russia.
aspx (accessed: 20.08.2019).
Received: September 5, 2019 
Accepted: October 3, 2019
Au t h o r ’s  i n f o r m a t i o n:
Eric Shiraev — PhD in Political Psychology, Professor; eshiraev@gmu.edu
